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Abstract
Alice and Bob want to share a secret key and to communicate an independent message, both of which
they desire to be kept secret from an eavesdropper Eve. We study this problem of secret communication
and secret key generation when two resources are available – correlated sources at Alice, Bob, and
Eve, and a noisy broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Eve which is independent of the sources.
We are interested in characterizing the fundamental trade-off between the rates of the secret message
and secret key. We present an achievable solution and prove its optimality for the parallel channels and
sources case when each sub-channel and source component satisfies a degradation order (either in favor
of the legitimate receiver or the eavesdropper). This includes the case of jointly Gaussian sources and
an additive Gaussian channel, for which the secrecy region is evaluated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Alice has a secret message she wants to send to Bob, but unfortunately, she must do so in the presence
of Eve, an eavesdropper. This paper explores a new dimension of this familiar problem: how can Alice
efficiently utilize two disparate resources to keep this message secret from Eve? The first resource is a
one-way noisy broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Eve, and the second resource is the presence
of correlated source observations at Alice, Bob, and Eve. Specifically, we are interested in understanding
how to design strategies that “fuse” these resources optimally in order to support secure communication
between Alice and Bob.
V. M. Prabhakaran is with the School of Technology and Computer Science, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai
400005, India. K. Eswaran was with the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, University of California,
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2There already exists a body of literature for cases in which only one of these resources is available.
Wyner’s seminal work, “The Wire-tap Channel” [1] considered secure communication over degraded
broadcast channels [2] and was later generalized by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3] to cover all broadcast channels.
Analogously, Ahlswede and Csisza´r [4] and Maurer [5] recognized that dependent source observations
available at the terminals can be used as a resource for generating a secret-key – a uniform random variable
shared by Alice and Bob which Eve is oblivious of – if the terminals can communicate over a noiseless
public channel (which delivers all its input faithfully to all the terminals including the eavesdropper).
In [4], the secret-key capacity of dependent sources was characterized if a one-way noiseless public
channel from Alice to Bob and Eve of unconstrained capacity is available. The characterization for the
case when there is a constraint on the capacity of the public channel was later found by Csisza´r and
Narayan [6] as a special case of their results on a class of common randomness generation problems
using a helper. As in the channel setting, one can also exploit distributed sources for sending a secret
message.
The present investigation is motivated by wireless sensor networks, in which sensors have access to
both a wireless channel and their correlated sensor readings. Note that in such situations, fading can
cause the channel characteristics to be more or less favorable to secrecy at different points in time. Thus,
when the channel characteristics are favorable, it can be advantageous for Alice and Bob, instead of
(or in addition to) sending a specific secret message, to simply agree on a sequence of private common
random bits (a secret key) to be used later when the characteristics are unfavorable. See Khalil et al.
[7] for an example of how this can enable a form of secure communication with delay constraints under
fading channels. Not surprisingly, it turns out that in some settings, one can achieve higher rates for
the secret key than the more restrictive secret message. The general problem we consider abstracts this
issue into considering a tradeoff between transmitting a uniform source privately (a secret message) and
generating private common randomness (a secret key). A related model for the secret message case was
studied by Chen and Vinck [8], who consider a channel with non-causal channel state information at
Alice, and the channel is degraded in favor of Bob, as in Wyner’s wiretap channel. A more recent work
by Khisti, Diggavi and Wornell [9] also examines secret key agreement when non-causal channel state
information is available at Alice. The achievability result there coincides with the results in this paper
when it is specialized to the one there. In independent and concurrent work as ours, Khisti, Diggavi and
Wornell [10] also investigate secrecy in a similar setting, but their focus is solely on the question of
secret key generation and limited to the case where only Alice and Bob have source observations. The
achievability results and an optimality result in their work coincide with the results in this paper under
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3the specialized setting above. Additionally, a general upper bound on the secret key capacity is provided
in [10].
In contradistinction to these other works, our main contributions are (i) an achievable trade-off between
secret-key and secret-message rates when both dependent sources and a one-way broadcast channel are
available, (ii) a proof of optimality of this trade-off for parallel channels and sources when each sub-
channel and source component satisfies a degradation order either in favor of Bob or in favor or of Eve,
and (iii) evaluation of this optimal trade-off in the Gaussian case.
Section II gives a formal description of the problem setup, and Section III describes the main results
presented in this work. Section IV gives an interpretation to the achievability part of the coding theorem
The paper concludes with a discussion and directions for future work in Section V.
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Fig. 1. Problem setup: Alice and Bob want to share a key K and independent message M , both of which they want to be
kept secret from Eve. Alice has a memoryless broadcast channel to Bob and Eve. Additionally, Alice, Bob, and Eve have make
correlated memoryless source observations.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
Notation: We denote random variables by upper-case letters (e.g., X), their realizations by lower-case
letters (e.g., x), and the alphabets over which they take values by calligraphic letters (e.g., X ). A vector
(Xk,Xk+1, . . . ,Xn) will be denoted by Xnk . When k = 1, the subscript will be dropped as in Xn =
(X1,X2, . . . ,Xn).
We consider the following model. Alice, Bob and Eve observe, respectively, the dependent memoryless
processes (sources) SA,k, SB,k, SE,k, where k = 1, 2, . . . is the time index. They have a joint distribution
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4pSA,SB,SE over the alphabet SA×SB×SE . Independent of these sources, there is a memoryless broadcast
channel from Alice to Bob and Eve given by pY,Z|X , where Xk is the input to the channel, Yk is Bob’s
output, and Zk Eve’s. We will also allow Alice to have access to a private random variable ΦA which
is not available to Bob and Eve and which is independent of all other random variables. Alice may use
this private random variable for purposes of randomization.
For ǫ > 0, a random variable U is defined to be ǫ-recoverable from another random variable V if there
is a function f such that Pr(U 6= f(V )) ≤ ǫ. Suppose the parties make n observations of their sources,
and Alice sends an n-length input Xn to the channel. The input is a function of the observation SnA, the
secret message M which is uniformly distributed over its alphabet M and independent of the sources
and channel, and the private random variable ΦA available only to Alice. We say that K = g(SnA,ΦA),
for some g, is an ǫ-secret-key if (i) it is ǫ-recoverable from SnB, Y n, (ii) satisfies the secrecy condition1
1
n
I(M,K;Zn, SnE) ≤ ǫ, (1)
and (iii) satisfies the uniformity condition
1
n
H(K) ≥
1
n
log |K| − ǫ,
where K is the alphabet over which K takes its values. We define (RSK,ǫ, RSM,ǫ) to be an ǫ-achievable
rate pair if there is an ǫ-secret-key Kn such that 1
n
H(K(n)) = RSK,ǫ, the secret message M is ǫ-
recoverable from (Y n, SnB), and 1n log |M| = RSM,ǫ. A rate pair (RSK, RSM) is said to be achievable if
there is a sequence of ǫn such that (RSK,ǫn , RSM,ǫn) are ǫn-achievable rate pairs, and as n→∞,
ǫn → 0, RSK,ǫn → RSK, and RSM,ǫn → RSM.
We define the rate region C to be the set of all achievable rate pairs.
III. RESULTS
In order to state our main results we will consider a more general setup than what we described above.
Consider a memoryless broadcast channel pY,Z|X,S with non-causal state information Sn available at the
encoder Alice whose input to the channel is Xn; Bob and Eve receive, respectively, Yn and Zn. The
state sequence Sn is independent and identically distributed with a probability mass function pS . Note
that the setting in Section II is a special case with Sk = SA,k, Yk = (Yk, SB,k), and Zk = (Zk, SE,k).
1A stronger form of secrecy can be achieved by directly invoking the ideas in [11] as will be briefly discussed in Section V.
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5Let Pjoint be the set of all joint distributions p of random variables V,U,X, S,Y,Z such that (i) the
following Markov chain holds:
V −U− (X,S) − (Y,Z) ,
(ii) V is independent of S, and (iii) the joint conditional distribution of (Y,Z) given (X,S) as well as
the marginal distribution of S are consistent with the given source and channel respectively. Let Cjoint
denote the set of all achievable rate pairs for this channel.
For p ∈ Pjoint, let Rjoint(p) be the set of all non-negative pairs (RSK, RSM) which satisfy the following
two inequalities:
RSM ≤ I(U;Y)− I(U;S) (2)
RSK +RSM ≤ I(U;Y|V) − I(U;Z|V) . (3)
We prove the following theorem in Appendix A.
Theorem 1.
Cjoint ⊇
⋃
p∈Pjoint
Rjoint(p) . (4)
We obtain our main achievability result as a corollary of the above theorem.
Let P be the set of all joint distributions p of random variables U1, V1, V2,X, Y, Z, SA, SB , SE such
that (i) (U1, SA, SB , SE) and (V1, V2,X, Y, Z) are independent, (ii) the following two Markov chains
hold:
U1 − SA − (SB , SE),
V2 − V1−X − (Y,Z),
(iii) the joint distribution of (SA, SB , SE) and the joint conditional distribution of (Y,Z) given X are
consistent with the given source and channel respectively, and (iv) the following inequality holds:
I(V1;Y ) ≥ I(U1;SA)− I(U1;SB). (5)
For p ∈ P, let R(p) be the set of all non-negative pairs (RSK, RSM) which satisfy the following two
inequalities
RSM ≤ I(V1;Y )− (I(U1;SA)− I(U1;SB)), (6)
RSK +RSM ≤ [I(V1;Y |V2)− I(V1;Z|V2)]+ + [I(U1;SB)− I(U1;SE)]+, (7)
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6where [x]+
def
= max(0, x). The next theorem states that all pairs of rates belonging to R(p) are achievable.
An interpretation of the result is presented in Section IV.
Theorem 2.
C ⊇
⋃
p∈P
R(p).
Remark: It can be shown that in taking the union above, it suffices to consider auxiliary random variables
with a sufficiently large, but finite cardinality. In particular, we may restrict the sizes of the alphabets
U1,V1,V2 of the auxiliary random variables U1, V1, V2, respectively, to |U1| = |SA| + 2, |V1| = (|X | +
3)(|X | + 1) and |V2| = |X | + 3. This can be shown using a strengthened form of Fenchel-Eggleston-
Carathe´odery’s theorem [12, pg. 310] (see, for example, [3] for a similar calculation).
Proof of Theorem 2. Set V = V2 and U = (U1, V1) in Theorem 1. Then we have the following:
I(U;Y)− I(U;S) = I(V1;Y ) + I(U1;SB)− I(U1;SA)
I(U;Y|V) − I(U;Z|V) = I(V1;Y |V2)− I(V1;Z|V2) + I(U1;SB)− I(U1;SE)
Note that if I(U1;SB)−I(U1;SE) ≤ 0, we can increase the achievable region by making U1 independent
of SA. Likewise, if I(V1;Y |V2)−I(V1;Z|V2) < 0, we can increase the region by making V1 = V2. Thus,
we have established the rate region in Theorem 2 as a special case.
The next theorem states that the above inner bound is tight for the case of parallel channels and
sources where each sub-channel and source component satisfies a degradation order (either in favor of
the legitimate receiver or in favor of the eavesdropper).
Theorem 3. Consider the following:
(i) The channel has two independent components2 denoted by F and R: X = (XF ,XR), Y = (YF , YR),
and Z = (ZF , ZR) such that pYF ,YR,ZF ,ZR|XF ,XR = pYF ,ZF |XF pYR,ZR|XR . Moreover, the first sub-
channel F is degraded in favor of Bob, which we call forwardly degraded, and the second sub-
channel R is degraded in favor of Eve, which we call reversely degraded; i.e., XF − YF −ZF and
XR − ZR − YR are Markov chains.
(ii) The sources also have two independent components, again denoted by F and R: SA = (SA,F , SA,R),
SB = (SB,F , SB,R), and SE = (SE,F , SE,R) with pSA,SB ,SE = pSA,F ,SB,F ,SE,F pSA,R,SB,RSE,R . The
first component is degraded in favor of Bob and the second in favor of Eve; i.e., SA,F −SB,F −SE,F
and SA,R − SE,R − SB,R are Markov chains.
2We denote the channel input, outputs, and the sources using bold letters to make this explicit.
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Fig. 2. Theorem 3 states that the inner bound to the rate region C established in Theorem 2 is tight if the sources and channels
can be decomposed to satisfy a degradation order, either in favor of Bob or Eve.
In this case,
C =
⋃
p∈P˜
R˜(p),
where P˜ is the set of joint distributions of the form pV2,F ,XF pYF ,ZF |XF pXRpYR,ZR|XRpU1,F |SA,F pSA,F ,SB,R,SE,R
pSA,R,SB,R,SE,R and R˜(p) is the set of non-negative pairs of (RSK, RSM) satisfying
RSM ≤ I(XF ;YF ) + I(XR;YR)− (I(U1,F ;SA,F )− I(U1,F ;SB,F )), and (8)
RSK +RSM ≤ I(XF ;YF |V2,F )− I(XF ;ZF |V2,F ) + I(U1,F ;SB,F )− I(U1,F ;SE,F ). (9)
We prove this theorem in Appendix B where we also show that, as one would expect, the result holds
even if we only have stochastic degradation instead of physical degradation. It turns out the result is more
general than the form presented above, but these extensions are omitted to be able to state the result
cleanly. These extensions are discussed in greater detail in Section V.
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Fig. 3. The scalar Gaussian case with no source observations at Eve.
A. The scalar Gaussian case
Let us consider a scalar Gaussian example (Figure 3). Suppose the observations of Alice and Bob are
jointly Gaussian. Then, without loss of generality, we can model them as
SB = SA +Nsource,
where SA and Nsource are independent zero mean Gaussian. Let Nsource be unit variance, and let the
variance of SA be SNRsrc. Let Eve have no source observation. Suppose that the broadcast channel has
additive Gaussian noise with a power constraint on X of SNRBob. Let
Y = X +NBob, and
Z = X +NEve,
where NBob and NEve are Gaussians independent of X, and such that NBob has unit variance and NEve
has a variance SNRBob/SNREve. We have the following proposition, which is plotted in Figure 4 and
proved in Appendix C.
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Fig. 4. The figure plots the optimal tradeoff between secret key and secret message from Proposition 4, which is the special
case in which there is no source at Eve. The tradeoff curves above reveal distinguishing features between the secret key and
secret message rates. For instance, the largest possible secret key rate is greater than that of the largest possible secret message
rate, and the tradeoff between key and message is governed by a curve that is not simply linear.
Proposition 4. The rate region C for this problem is set of all non-negative (RSK, RSM) pairs satisfying
RSM ≤
1
2
log
(1 + SNRsrc)(1 + SNRBob)
1 + SNRsrc +min(SNRBob, SNREve)
,
RSK ≤
1
2
log
(1 + SNRsrc)(1 + SNRBob) exp(−2RSM)− SNRsrc
1 + min(SNRBob, SNREve)
Remark: When Eve also has a source observation jointly Gaussian with the observations of Alice and
Bob, the problem is covered by the cases in Theorem 3. However, unlike in the proposition above, we
were unable to show that a Gaussian choice of the auxiliary random variables is optimal. Indeed, even
for the secret key problem under jointly Gaussian sources and only a public bit-pipe channel from Alice
to Bob and Eve, the optimality of Gaussian auxiliary random variables remains open to the best of our
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knowledge.
IV. INTUITION BEHIND THEOREM 2: A SEPARATION STRATEGY
In this section we will sketch informally the intuition behind the achievable scheme of Theorem 2. We
will briefly describe three examples before proceeding. Examples 1 and 2 highlight well known achievable
strategies in the secrecy literature. The key idea is shown in Example 3; namely, that the strategies in
Examples 1 and 2 can be used as building blocks to construct a strategy for Example 3, much in the
same way a source and a channel code can be used as building blocks to construct an achievable strategy
in a joint source-channel context. This is what we mean by a separation strategy, which establishes the
basic intuition for Theorem 2. The remainder of the section extends this to the more general problem
setup of the paper.
Example 1. Suppose Alice has a three-bit noiseless channel (x1, x2, x3) to Bob. Eve can observe only
two of the three bits sent by Alice (i.e. (x1, x2, ∗), (x1, ∗, x3), or (∗, x2, x3)), but not all of them. Alice
can use this advantage Bob has over Eve to send a one-bit secret message m ∈ {0, 1} to Bob such that
Eve will consider both outcomes to be equally likely. In order to do this, Alice may make use of two fair
coin tosses (c1, c2), denoted as 0 or 1. Then Alice chooses her channel inputs (x1, x2, x3) as follows:
(x1, x2, x3) = (c1, c2, c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕m) ,
where ⊕ is an XOR. Then Bob can decipher m from his three channel inputs simply by XORing all his
observations together. Eve, on the other hand, will have perfect equivocation on the value of m regardless
of which two bits she sees since all possible values are equiprobable regardless of the value of m.
The next example highlights how secrecy can be attained in the source setting.
Example 2. (a) Consider the setting in which Alice is allowed to transmit one bit x across a noiseless
public channel to Bob and Eve. Furthermore, Alice observes a two-bit string (s1, s2) uniformly distributed
over the set of all all 2-bit strings. Bob observes either the first bit (s1, ∗) or the second bit (∗, s2) of
Alice’s string, but not both, and Alice does not learn which of the two bits Bob observed. Eve observes
nothing. Then, Alice and Bob can agree to make the secret key the first bit, and Alice’s input to the
channel can simply be the XOR of her two bits:
x = s1 ⊕ s2 .
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Then, Bob has enough information to determine the secret key, but Eve has perfect equivocation since
she is equally likely to see 0 or 1 regardless of the value of the secret key.
(b) Suppose that Alice is allowed now to transmit two bits across the noiseless public channel (x1, x2)
to Bob and Eve, and the source observations are the same as in part (a). Instead of transmitting a secret
key, Alice is given a secret message m ∈ {0, 1} to communicate. Then, Alice can simply transmit
(x1, x2) = (s1 ⊕ s2, s1 ⊕m) ,
which in effect uses the first channel symbol to construct a secret key as in part (a), and the second to
use it as a one-time pad on the message. Since Bob can decode the secret key as earlier, Bob discovers
the secret message. Eve, on the other hand, has perfect equivocation about m since regardless of the
message, all four values of (x1, x2) are equiprobable.
We now provide an example to illustrate how the above strategies can be combined.
Example 3. Suppose Alice has a three-bit noiseless channel to Bob, and Eve can observe only two of the
three bits as in Example 1. Additionally, Alice and Bob have source observations as in Example 2, where
Eve observes no source. The key idea is to combine the strategies used above, except to replace Alice’s
coin tosses (c1, c2) in Example 1 with the input to the public channel from Example 2(b). Since Eve can
learn the values of the coin tosses if she observes the first two channel inputs, under this strategy, those
values function as a public bit pipe. This leads to the following channel inputs:
(c1, c2) = (s1 ⊕ s2, s1 ⊕m2)
(x1, x2, x3) = (c1, c2, c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕m1)
= (s1 ⊕ s2, s1 ⊕m2, s2 ⊕m1 ⊕m2)
With this combined strategy, Alice can send a two-bit secret message (m1,m2) to Bob, who can decode
m1 as in Example 1 and m2 as in Example 2(b). Eve, on the other hand, has perfect equivocation about
(m1,m2) since regardless of their values, all possible values are equally likely for whichever channel
symbols she can observe.
Example 3 provides the essence of our separation approach for transmitting a secret message and
matches the diagram shown in Figure 6:
1) Distill the channel into a public bit-pipe (c1, c2) in addition to the private bit-pipe x3 over which
the secret message is sent.
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2) Use part of the public bit-pipe to distill the sources and generate a secret key.
3) Use the remainder of the public bit-pipe to send a secret message by using the secret key just
generated as a one-time pad.
In the simple example above, we could exploit both the source and the channel to the fullest as seen
by comparing with Examples 1 and 2(b). However, in general, it may be not desirable or even possible
for Alice to attempt to convey her source to Bob (for instance, if the conditional entropy of the source
at Alice conditioned on that at Bob is larger than the capacity of the channel). In the sequel, we will
describe how the above strategy maps to this more general setting. The sketch of the strategy follows
the spirit of Examples 1, 2, and 3 and as described above, provide an interpretation of the result as a
separation strategy.
1) Case of no sources: Secrecy via the channel : Consider the case in which there is a noisy broadcast
channel from Alice to Bob and Eve; but there are no sources. Note that this resembles the cases studied
in Example 1 with the added wrinkle that the channel to Bob may also be noisy. Recall that in Example
1, given sufficiently many fair coin tosses, Alice uses the channel to send a message secretly to Bob.
The work of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3] generalizes this approach as a means of providing secrecy for all
noisy broadcast channels. They also consider a common message in addition to the private message and
characterize the set of all rate pairs such that the common message can be reliably recovered by both Bob
and Eve while the private message is recovered reliably by Bob, but remains secret from Eve3. We may
consider a slight twist to this setting. We again consider two independent messages – one private as in [3]
and the other what we call public – both uniformly distributed over their alphabets both of which need
to be delivered reliably to Bob with the former remaining a secret from Eve. The only difference from
the setting of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner is that we do not require the public message to be reliably recovered
by Eve. The following proposition can be proved directly following Csisza´r and Ko¨rner (also see [13]).
Proposition 5. For any given joint distribution of random variables V1, V2,X, Y, Z such that V2− V1−
X − (Y,Z) is a Markov chain and the joint conditional distribution of (Y,Z) given X is consistent with
the given channel, the rate pair (Rprivate, Rpublic) is achievable for the setting described above, where
Rprivate = [I(V1;Y |V2)− I(V1;Z|V2)]+, and
Rpublic = I(V1;Y )−Rprivate .
3In fact, they consider the equivocation rate of Eve as a third parameter and characterize the rate triple, but this is not relevant
to our discussion.
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The proof is a straightforward adaptation of the achievable strategy in [3]4.
2) Case of two noiseless bit pipes: Private and public : Now consider the setting in which the channel
is deterministic. In particular, the channel is made up of two bit-pipes: (1) a private bit-pipe of rate Rprivate
which delivers its input bits from Alice faithfully and only to Bob, and (2) a public bit-pipe of rate Rpublic
which delivers faithfully its input bits from Alice to both Bob and Eve.
Alice M ENC
Rprivate
Rpublic
DEC
sources
SnA S
n
B
Eve
Mˆ Bob
Fig. 5. Consider the case in which Alice and Bob share correlated source observations, and there is both a private bit-pipe
from Alice to Bob and a public bit-pipe from Alice to Bob and Eve. This generalizes the problem considered in Example 2,
and the strategy considered in that setting generalizes naturally, as well.
a) Secret-key only; no source observation at Eve: Consider the goal of generating the largest secret-
key rate possible when there is no source observation at Eve.5 This is reminiscent of Example 2(a) but
with two added dimensions not present in that setting. First, there may not be enough rate on the public
bit-pipe for Bob to determine Alice’s source observation perfectly to generate a secret key. A modified
form of Wyner-Ziv’s source coding strategy can be employed to handle this, which simply involves
4Roughly, the random coding argument runs as follows: a V2 codebook of rate I(V2; Y ) is formed and a conditional V1
codebook of rate I(V1;Y ) is formed for each V2 codeword. The conditional codebooks are binned so that the rate of each bin
is I(V1;Z|V2). At Alice, a part of the public message bits worth rate I(V2;Y ) selects the V2 codeword, the private message
selects the bin of the corresponding conditional V1 codebook and the rest of the public message selects the V1 codeword within
the bin. Bob performs joint typical decoding. The reliability and secrecy of the scheme can be shown along the lines of [3].
5When Eve has a dependent source observation SE , a further binning of the codebook described in this section can be used
to get a secret-key rate of
RSK = I(U ;SB)− I(U ;SE) +Rprivate,
where we restrict U to those which satisfy
I(U ;SA)− I(U ;SB) < Rpublic +Rprivate,
and the Markov chain U − SA − (SB , SE).
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quantizing Alice’s source and using that to generate the secret key. Second, in addition to the public bit-
pipe, there is also a private bit-pipe. Note that any component sent on the private bit-pipe is automatically
a secret key, as well. Thus, if part of the bin index is sent on the private bit-pipe, it is also secret from
Eve.
Then, given an auxiliary random variable U which satisfies the Markov chain U−SA−SB , a secret-key
rate of (I(U ;SB) +R) +Rprivate −R is achievable if
I(U ;SA)− I(U ;SB) ≤ Rpublic +R, and
R ≤ Rprivate.
Again, the work of Ahlswede-Csisza´r [4] can be used to show that this has the required secrecy and
uniformity properties, and thus, the resulting secret-key rate is
RSK = (I(U ;SB) +R) + (Rprivate −R) = I(U ;SB) +Rprivate,
where we restrict U to those which satisfy
I(U ;SA)− I(U ;SB) < Rpublic +Rprivate,
and the Markov chain U − SA − SB.
b) Secret message only; no source observation at Eve: Consider the case in which Alice desires
to communicate a message secretly at the largest possible rate when there is no source observation at
Eve.6 This scenario, depicted in Figure 5, is a straightforward generalization of Example 2(b) from the
introduction. In that example, Alice achieves secrecy across a public bit-pipe by binning her source
observation based on Bob’s side information to generate a shared secret key. On the rest of the public
bit-pipe, Alice uses this key as a one-time pad to send the secret message.
As earlier, there are two added dimensions in the current setting that are not present in Example 2(b).
First, there may not be enough rate on the public bit-pipe for Bob to determine Alice’s source observation
perfectly and thus generate a secret key. Again, Alice simply quantizes the source observation and applies
6When Eve has a correlated source observation, a further binning of the codebook described in this section can be used to
get a secret message rate of
RSM = Rprivate + [I(U ;SB)− I(U ;SE)]+,
where U satisfies the Markov chain U − SA − (SB , SE) and the condition
Rpublic > I(U ;SA).
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the binning strategy as before, which corresponds to Wyner-Ziv’s source coding scheme. Second, in
addition to the public bit-pipe, there is also a private bit-pipe. Because there is now a secret message, we
split the message into two parts: the private bit-pipe is used fully to send part of the secret message (at
rate Rprivate), and the public bit-pipe is used as before to communicate the remaining bits secretly with
the correlated sources being exploited to provide the secrecy. However, since we now have to agree on
specific random bits instead of any common random bits, we have two additional restrictions, which can
cause the rate of the secret message to be lower than the secret key case above. First, we have to reserve
part of the public bit-pipe for sending the one-time padded secret message, which constrains part of the
public bit-pipe rate Rpublic for generating the secret key from the sources. Second, sending part of the
Wyner-Ziv bin index on the private bit-pipe will cost rate that can be used for sending a private message.
Thus, it is better to reserve the private bit-pipe for sending a secret message, which costs R ≤ Rprivate
bits that could have been used for generating the secret key, which means the rate of the secret key used
as a one-time pad, and thus the effectiveness of the public bit-pipe, is significantly limited compared
with the case of the secret key.
The work of Ahlswede-Csisza´r [4] can be adapted to show that this approach satisfies the required
secrecy and uniformity properties. The secret-key is then used as a one-time pad to encrypt some extra
messages bits. Using this approach, given any joint distribution of U−SA−SB , a secret key of I(U ;SB)
can be generated by consuming I(U ;SA)− I(U ;SB) bits from the public bit-pipe. This secret key can
then be used as a one-time pad on another I(U ;SB) bits of the public bit-pipe to send a secret message
of that rate. Hence, we must choose auxiliary random variable U such that
Rpublic > (I(U ;SA)− I(U ;SB)) + I(U ;SB) = I(U ;SA),
and the total secret message rate obtained is
RSM = Rprivate + I(U ;SB).
Unlike in the work of Csiszar-Narayan [6], in which Alice and Bob only need to agree on any common
random bits to construct a secret key, for a secret message, we have the added constraint that they must
agree on specific random bits. Thus, the rates achievable for secret message are less than those achievable
for secret key.
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c) Secret message – secret-key tradeoff; no source observation at Eve: A secret-message – secret-
key tradeoff optimal strategy here7 turns out to be a natural combination of the above two: If (1) RSM ≤
Rprivate, the secret-message is sent entirely over the private bit-pipe, and the left-over rate (Rprivate−RSM)
of the private bit-pipe rate along with the public bit-pipe is used for agreeing on a secret-key from the
correlated sources. This secret-key step is essentially the secret-key only case discussed above. Otherwise,
i.e., if (2) RSM ≥ Rprivate, all of the private bit-pipe is used to carry a part of the secret message. For
communicating the rest of the secret message, at a rate of RSM−Rprivate, and for agreeing on a secret-key,
the public bit-pipe and the sources are made use of. The way the public bit-pipe is used is essentially
the same as in the secret message only case above. The only difference is that instead of utilizing all of
the secret-key generated from the sources as a one-time pad to secure communication of a message over
the public bit-pipe, here, only a part of the secret-key is used for this purpose. The rate of the unused
part of the secret-key is RSK.
The resulting tradeoff is given by
RSM ≤ Rpublic +Rprivate − (I(U ;SA)− I(U ;SB)), and
RSM +RSK ≤ I(U ;SB) +Rprivate,
where U satisfies the Markov chain U − SA − SB and the condition
I(U ;SA)− I(U ;SB) ≤ Rpublic +Rprivate.
3) The General case: Now let us turn to the general case with sources in which the channel is not
necessarily deterministic. This resembles Example 3, and as in that case, we can apply a combination
of the strategies in Section IV-1 and IV-2. Indeed, by treating the random coin tosses Alice uses in
Proposition 5 as a public bit-pipe, we can construct a public and private bit-pipe from the channel
and can leverage the source strategy from Section IV-2. This approach enables us to obtain the rates
7When Eve has a correlated source observation SE , the tradeoff becomes
RSM ≤ Rpublic +Rprivate − (I(U ;SA)− I(U ;SB)), and
RSM +RSK ≤ [I(U ;SB)− I(U ;SE)]+ +Rprivate,
where U satisfies the Markov chain U − SA − SB and the condition
I(U ;SA)− I(U ;SB) ≤ Rpublic +Rprivate.
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Fig. 6. The intuition behind Theorem 2. In this approach, the channel is distilled into a public bit pipe and a private one. The
sources take advantage of part of the rate from each of these channels to generate a secret key. This key is divided into the final
secret key and a one-time pad, the latter of which is used to secure the remainder of the public bit pipe for sending part of the
secret message. The remainder of the private bit pipe is used to send the remainder of the secret message.
in (6) and (7). However, we should note that neither the independence requirement nor the uniformity
requirement in Proposition 5 hold for the messages sent over the bitpipes in IV-2, though they may
hold approximately. And hence, this discussion does not constitute a proof of Theorem 2. Formalizing
the above is an alternative approach to proving Theorem 2, but we do not pursue it here. A schematic
interpretation of the discussion in this section is shown in Figure 6.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Extensions and Additional Results
a) Stochastically degraded sources and channels: There are several additional results related to the
present work that we wish to note. For instance, it turns out that the result presented in Theorem 3
holds more generally than the degradedness conditions outlined. First, the degradedness conditions can
be relaxed to stochastically degraded conditions for both the source and channels. This simply involves
a slightly more cumbersome argument in our converse proof, but no changes to the achievable strategy
are necessary. For completeness, the converse argument is given in Appendix B.
b) Bandwidth mismatch: We only considered the case of matched bandwidths, i.e., there is one
source symbol per every channel symbol. Our results can be readily extended when there is a bandwidth
mismatch of say mS source symbols for every mC channel symbols. By considering a vector source
with mS symbols and vector channel with mC symbols, we can directly invoke Theorem 2. Further,
by restricting the auxiliary random variables to be i.i.d. across the vector components we can arrive at
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the following achievable region. Let Pmismatch be the set of all joint distributions p of random variables
U1, V1, V2,X, Y, Z, SA, SB , SE which satisfy the same conditions as in the definition of P except for (5)
being replaced by
mCI(V1;Y ) ≥ mS(I(U1;SA)− I(U1;SB).
Let Rmismatch(p), for p ∈ Pmismatch be the set of all rate pairs (RSK, RSM) which satisfy
RSM ≤ I(V1;Y )−
mS
mC
(I(U1;SA)− I(U1;SB)),
RSK +RSM ≤ [I(V1;Y |V2)− I(V1;Z|V2)]+ +
mS
mC
[I(U1;SB)− I(U1;SE)]+.
Then the set Cmismatch of all achievable rate pairs, where rates are measured per channel use, satisfies
Cmismatch ⊇
⋃
p∈Pmismatch
Rmismatch(p).
For the degraded case considered in Theorem 3, we can also show the optimality of the above achievable
region under bandwidth mismatch. Appendix B discusses the modifications needed in the converse. A
consequence of this is that the optimality of Gaussian signalling shown in Proposition 4 continues to
hold even under bandwidth mismatch.
c) Strong secrecy: All the secrecy results in this paper can be directly strengthened by dropping
the 1/n factor in (1) without any penalty on the rates achieved. This follows directly from the work of
Maurer and Wolf [11] on privacy amplification using extractors. Maurer and Wolf demonstrate this for the
problems of secret key agreement of Ahlswede and Csisza´r, and secure message transmission of Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner. The key idea is to perform several (independent) repetitions of the scheme which produces
weakly secure keys and achieves weakly secure data transmission. A privacy amplification step using
an extractor can be employed on the weakly secure keys to generate a strongly secure key. The privacy
amplification step involves Alice using a small (polylogarithmic in blocklength) purely random key which
she needs to share with Bob over a public channel. Alice will need to use the broadcast channel to do this,
but the overhead involved is negligible and does not affect the rates achieved. To send a strongly secure
message in addition to generating a strongly secure key, Alice will first invert the extractor operation to
produce the equivalent weakly secure messages that when passed through the extractor would produce the
strongly secure message she intends to transmit. Then she proceeds to transmit these equivalent weakly
secure messages using the scheme in this paper. The small key is also sent separately using a channel
code. At the end of all the transmissions, Bob who will have recovered all the weakly secure keys and
weakly secure messages as well as the small key can invoke the extractor to recover the strongly secure
key and the strongly secure message.
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d) Two extensions of Theorem 3: Two other extensions of the results in Theorem 3 were shown in
[14]. First, given only the sources and a public bit-pipe from Alice to Bob and Eve, the condition under
which Alice and Bob cannot generate a positive rate secret-key is in fact weaker than the case where
the sources are degraded in favor of Eve8. Under this weaker condition, it was shown in [14] that the
optimal strategy involves ignoring the sources, and utilizing only the channel. In particular, R(p) is now
the set of all non-negative rate pairs satisfying the condition
RSK +RSM = [I(V1;Y )− I(V1;Z)]+,
where V1−X−(Y,Z) is a Markov chain. Thus the optimal strategy in this case reduces to that of Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner [3], and there is essentially no distinction between sending a secret message and generating
a secret-key.
Second, a channel degraded in favor of Eve is a condition under which the channel resource by itself
cannot provide any secrecy, but note that the condition under which the channel resource cannot provide
any secrecy is looser than this type of degradation. This condition is when the channel to Eve is ‘less
noisy’ than the channel to Bob [3, Corollary 3, pg. 341]. Under this looser condition, but when the source
component degraded in favor of Eve is absent, the optimality of turning the channel into a public bit-pipe
was shown in [14] for secret-key generation. In the special case where Eve has no source observation,
this optimality was shown for secret communication as well.
e) Secure source-channel coding: Note that sending a secret message is equivalent to the case in
which Alice must send a discrete uniform source losslessly to Bob that must be kept secret from Eve.
A straightforward extension of our result for the secret message case, shown in [15], demonstrates that
optimality continues to hold if one is interested in reconstructing any discrete memoryless source, both
for the lossless and lossy cases. In this situation, an additional layer of separation between the private
bit pipes and the compression of the source can be shown to establish the result.
B. Open problems
The above extensions do not close the door on this problem, and there are several considerations that
currently warrant further research. Indeed, the general rate region and structure of optimal strategies are
8This condition which can be inferred from [4] is that for every U˜1, U˜2 satisfying the Markov chain U˜2−U˜1−SA−(SB, SE),
I(U˜1;SB |U˜2) ≤ I(U˜1;SE |U˜2).
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still open problems. One avenue is to consider extensions of the result beyond the degraded case and
beyond some of the extensions discussed above.
Another interesting avenue to consider is the setting in which the sources and channel are correlated.
Note that in such a setting, there may not be a clean distinction between a source observation and a
channel output at either Bob or Eve, which resembles the setup for Theorem 1. Indeed, the strategy and
proof presented for Theorem 1 continues to hold if the sources and channels are correlated.
Furthermore, the setting of the strategy presented in Theorem 1 coincides with a problem studied by
Chen and Vinck [8], in which Alice must send Bob a secret message (i.e., RSK = 0), Alice has non-causal
state information about the channel. Chen and Vinck make the additional assumption that Eve observes
degraded versions of Bob’s channel outputs, but Theorem 1 holds even without this assumption. In fact,
when Chen and Vinck’s scheme is considered in the context of Theorem 3 (i.e., independent sources
and channels), but with the degradedness condition of Chen and Han Vinck (i.e., there is no reversely
degraded channel component), we already know from Theorem 3 that the secrecy capacity is given by
CSM = maxmin{I(XF ;YF )− I(U ;SA|SB), I(XF ;YF |V )− I(XF ;ZF |V ) + I(U ;SB |SE)}, (10)
where the maximization is over joint distributions of the form pV,XF pU,SA . Chen and Han Vinck’s
achievable secrecy rate is
R = maxmin{I(W ;Y )− I(W ;SA), I(W ;Y )− I(W ;Z)}
= maxmin{I(W ;YF , SB)− I(W ;SA), I(W ;YF , SB)− I(W ;ZF , SE)}, (11)
where the maximization is over pW,XF |SA . Whenever the maximizer of (10) is such that V is a constant,
we may choose W = (XF , U) in (11) to match the capacity. For instance, in the Gaussian example of
Section III-A, it is indeed the case that optimal joint distribution involves a constant V . Note that the
Gaussian case of Chen and Vinck’s scheme was first considered by Mitrpant, Vinck and Luo [16]. But
in general, it does not appear to be the case that (11) equals the secrecy capacity in (10).
While Chen and Vinck present an upper bound on the secret message rate, it does not coincide
with either their achievable strategy or Theorem 1. The work in [17] provides a marginal improvement
to the upper bound presented by Chen and Vinck, but the problems of characterizing the rate region
and optimal strategies remain open. Indeed, this region may also be tightened by improving upon the
achievable strategy in Theorem 1.
Progress on any of these fronts could lead to new insights on how strategies may optimally combine
source and channel resources for secrecy, as well as on the interplay between secret keys and messages.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Since a secret message automatically satisfies the constraints of a secret key, it is enough to prove that
the following (RSK, RSM) pair is achievable.
RSM = min(I(U;Y) − I(U;S), I(U;Y|V) − I(U;Z|V)), and
RSK = [I(U;Y|V) − I(U;Z|V) − (I(U;Y) − I(U;S))]+
= [I(U;S) − I(V;Y)− I(U;Z|V)]+.
We divide the proof into two cases. In each case, we use a random coding argument to show the
existence of a codebook for which the probability of an encoding error at Alice, decoding error at Bob,
and decoding error at Eve given additional side information are all small. We then show that such a code
satisfies the secrecy and uniformity conditions.
A. Case 1: I(U;S) ≤ I(V;Y) + I(U;Z|V)
In this case, we need only prove that the pair
RSM = I(U;Y|V) − I(U;Z|V), and
RSK = 0
is achievable.
Random Coding Argument
a) Codebook generation: We create a codebook of blocklength n with 2n(I(U;Y)−3δ) elements
composed of two parts. We create a blocklength-n V-codebook of size 2n(I(V;Y)−δ) by drawing the
codewords uniformly from the ǫ-strongly typical set [12, Chapter 1.2] A∗(n)ǫ of n-length V sequences. Let
us index these codewords using i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(I(V;Y)−δ)}. For each such codeword vn(i), a conditional
U-codebook of size 2n(I(U;Y|V)−2δ) is created by drawing the codewords uniformly from the set of all
n-length U sequences which are conditionally ǫ-strongly typical conditioned on the V sequence vn. For
each such conditional codebook, we distribute these sequences into 2n(RSM−δ) bins such that each bin
contains 2n(I(U;Z|V)−δ) codewords, indexing each bin by m ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(RSM−δ)}. Let the codewords in
each bin be indexed by j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(I(U;Z|V)−δ)}.
Note that there is a direct correspondence between the bins, and the private bit-pipe, with the code-
words in each bin and the V-codebook corresponding to the public bit-pipe of the separation strategy.
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Fig. 7. The codebook used for Case 1 of the achievable strategy consists of a V-codebook, each codeword of which indexes
a conditional codebook. The bins in the conditional codebook correspond directly to the private bit-pipe, and the V-codebook
and codewords in each bin to the public bit-pipe. Analogously, the codewords in each conditional codebook correspond to
quantization points for the source Sn.
Furthermore, as will be seen in encoding, the U-codewords are simply quantization points for the source
Sn. A schematic of this codebook is depicted in Figure 7.
In this separation context, Case 1 refers to the scenario in which there is insufficient randomness from
the source Sn alone to determine the input to the public bit-pipe. Thus, we further divide the set of all
U-codewords into 2n(I(V;Y)+I(U;Z|V)−I(U;S)−3δ) buckets9 as follows: if (i) I(U;S) ≥ I(V;Y), that is,
there is sufficient randomness in the source to determine the V-codeword completely, we divide up the
codewords in each bin of every conditional codebook among the buckets such that each bucket has the
same number of codewords. Thus, in each bin of each of the conditional codebooks there are
2n(I(U;Z|V)−δ−I(V;Y)−I(U;Z|V)+I(U;S)+3δ) = 2n(I(U;S)−I(V;Y)+2δ)
codewords which belong to a given bucket. If (ii) I(U;S) < I(V;Y), then, the U-codewords are divided
up among the buckets such that every bucket has no more than one codeword which belongs to the same
9For there to be at least one bucket, we require that 3δ < I(V;Y) + I(U;Z|V) − I(U;S). However, this is not an issue
since we will take δ → 0.
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bin of a conditional codebook. In this case, for a given bucket, there are
2n(I(U;Y)−3δ−(RSM−δ)−(I(V;Y)+I(U;Z|V)−I(U;S)−3δ)) = 2n(I(U;S)+δ)
codewords each belonging to a different conditional codebook and holding the same bin index. The
buckets are indexed by k ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(I(V;Y)+I(U;Z|V)−I(U;S)−3δ)}. For a U-codeword, we will explicity
indicate its bucket index along with the conditional codebook it belongs to, its bin-index and its index
within the bin as un(i,m, j, k).
b) Encoding: Let m ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(RSM−δ)} index the secret message. To send m, using her pri-
vate random string ΦA, Alice obtains a Φbucket which is uniformly distributed over the set {1, . . . ,
2n(I(V;Y)+I(U;Z|V)−I(U;S)−3δ)}, assigns k = Φbucket, and looks in bin m (of all the conditional code-
books) for a Vn(i),Un(i,m, j, k) such that (Vn(i),Un(i,m, j, k), Sn) are jointly typical. Thus, the U
codeword is selected such that it belongs to bin m and bucket k = Φbucket and such that it is jointly
typical with the source observation Sn. If more than one choice is found, Alice chooses one of them
arbitrarily. If none are found, Alice declares an error. A test channel pX|U,S stochastically generates the
channel input Xn.
The probability of encoding failure can be bounded as follows. In case (i),
Pe ≤Pr(S
n /∈ A∗(n)ǫ ) +
∑
sn∈A∗(n)ǫ
pS(s
n)
∑
k
pΦbucket(k)·



 ∑
vn∈A∗(n)ǫ
Pr(Vn = vn)
[
1− Pr((vn,Un, sn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ |V
n = vn)
]2n(I(U;S)−I(V;Y)+2δ)
2n(I(V;Y)−δ)

 .
where the term Pr(Vn = vn) is evaluated with the distribution for Vn being given by the uniform
distribution over all ǫ-strongly typical vn sequences, and Pr((vn,Un, sn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ |Vn = vn) is evaluated
with the distribution for Un being given by the uniform distribution over all un sequences which are
conditionally ǫ-strongly typical with vn. Since V and S are independent, for sn ∈ A∗(n)ǫ and vn ∈ A∗(n)ǫ ,
this probability is
Pr((vn,Un, sn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ |V
n = vn) ≥ 2−n(I(U;S|V)+ǫ1). (12)
Here ǫ1 → 0 as ǫ→ 0. This will also be the case for any future subscripted ǫ# in the sequel. Using this
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in the term within the braces in the upperbound for Pe and simplifying
 ∑
vn∈A∗(n)ǫ
Pr(vn)
[
1− Pr((vn,Un, sn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ |V
n = vn)
]2n(I(U;S)−I(V;Y)+2δ)
2n(I(V;Y)−δ)
≤
[[
1− 2−n(I(U;S|V)+ǫ1)
]2n(I(U;S)−I(V;Y)+2δ)]2n(I(V;Y)−δ)
(a)
≤ e−2
n(I(U;S)+δ)2−n(I(U;S|V)+ǫ1)
(b)
= e−2
n(δ−ǫ1)
,
where (a) follows from (1−x)n ≤ e−nx, and (b) from the fact that I(U;S) = I(V,U;S) = I(U;S|V)
which in turn is a consequence of the Markov chain V − U − S and the independence of V and S.
Substituting this in the upperbound for Pe,
Pe ≤Pr(S
n /∈ A∗(n)ǫ ) +

 ∑
sn∈A
∗(n)
ǫ
pS(s
n)
∑
k
pΦbucket(k)

 · e−2n(δ−ǫ1)
=Pr(Sn /∈ A∗(n)ǫ ) + (1− Pr(S
n /∈ A∗(n)ǫ ))e
−2n(δ−ǫ1).
Thus, we can make Pe as small as desired by choosing sufficiently small δ, ǫ (δ > ǫ1), and sufficiently
large n.
Under case (ii), the probability of encoding failure can be similarly bounded. Now, we have
Pe ≤Pr(S
n /∈ A∗(n)ǫ ) +
∑
sn∈A
∗(n)
ǫ
pS(s
n)
∑
k
pΦbucket(k)·



 ∑
vn∈A∗(n)ǫ
Pr(vn)
[
1− Pr((vn,Un, sn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ |V
n = vn)
]
2n(I(U;S)+δ)

 .
where the term Pr((vn,Un, sn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ |Vn = vn) can be evaluated as in (12). Substituting this above
and following similar steps, by choosing sufficiently small δ, ǫ (δ > ǫ1), and sufficiently large n, we can
make Pe as small as desired.
c) Decoding at Bob: Bob receives Yn and searches for a unique (Vn,Un) pair such that (Vn,Un,Yn)
that are ǫ-strongly jointly typical. If no such pair exists, Bob declares an error. Otherwise, Bob identifies
the corresponding bin-index mˆ, and declares this the secret message. Hence, conditioned on encoding
being successful, a decoding error results only if there is a mˆ 6= m such that, there are iˆ, jˆ, kˆ such that
(vn(ˆi),un(ˆi, mˆ, jˆ, kˆ),Yn) are ǫ-strongly jointly typical. Using the union bound, we can upperbound the
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probability of this by
∑
iˆ
∑
mˆ 6=m
∑
jˆ
Pr
(
(Vn(ˆi),Un(ˆi, mˆ, jˆ),Yn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ
)
=
∑
iˆ 6=i
∑
mˆ 6=m
∑
jˆ
Pr
(
(Vn(ˆi),Un(ˆi, mˆ, jˆ),Yn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ
)
+
∑
mˆ6=m
∑
jˆ
Pr
(
(Vn(i),Un(i, mˆ, jˆ),Yn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ
)
≤ 2n(I(U;Y)−3δ)2−n(I(U;Y)−ǫ2) + 2n(RSM−δ)2n(I(U;Z|V)−δ)2−n(I(U;Y|V)−ǫ3)
which can be made as small as desired by choosing sufficiently small δ, ǫ (δ > ǫ2, ǫ3), and sufficiently
large n.
d) Decoding at Eve with side information: Consider Eve who has access to M,Vn. Then, the bin in
which a potential Un exists is known to be at most 2n(I(U;Z|V)−δ). We may upperbound the probability
of decoding error as we did above. Consider the jointly typical decoder for Un given Zn in this bin.
There are two error events: E1 is the event no sequence in the bin is jointly typical with Zn, and E2 is
the event a false sequence in the subbin is jointly typical with Zn. We have, Pr(E1) → 0 as n → ∞
and the probability a false sequence is jointly typical with Zn is 2−n(I(U;Z|V)−ǫ4). By a union bound,
we can make the probability of error as small as desired by choosing sufficiently small δ, ǫ (δ > ǫ4),
and sufficiently large n.
By the usual random coding arguments, we may now conclude that for any δ > 0, for sufficiently
large n, there exists a codebook (with rates as in the codebook construction above) such that (i) Bob can
recover the secret message with probability of error not larger than δ and (ii) Eve, when provided with
the message and the V codeword, can recover the U codeword with probability of error not larger than
δ. We now simply have to verify that this codebook also has the property that Eve’s information about
the message (given Zn) is small, i.e., the secrecy condition.
Proof of Secrecy Condition.
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First observe that
H(M |Zn) ≥ H(M |Zn,Vn)
= H(M,Zn|Vn)−H(Zn|Vn)
= H(M,Un,Zn|Vn)−H(Un|M,Zn,Vn)−H(Zn|Vn)
(a)
≥ H(Un,Zn|Vn)−H(Un|M,Zn,Vn)−H(Zn|Vn)
= H(Un|Vn) +H(Zn|Un,Vn)−H(Un|M,Zn,Vn)−H(Zn|Vn). (13)
where (a) follows from non-negativity of conditional entropy. We now bound each of these terms.
Let us define, for every un(i,m, j, k) codeword
E = {sn : ∃(i,m, j, k) such that (vn(i),un(i,m, j, k), sn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ }
Recall that for all α > 0, there exists n sufficiently large such that decoding (and hence encoding)
succeeds with probability greater than 1− α, i.e.,
Pr(Sn ∈ E) ≥ 1− α .
Furthermore, the probability
Pr((Vn,Un) = (vn(i),un(i,m, j, k)), Sn ∈ E)
= Pr(M = m,Φbucket = k, (V
n,Un) = (vn(i),un(i,m, j, k)), Sn ∈ E)
≤ Pr(M = m) · 2−n(I(V;Y)+I(U;Z|V)−I(U;S)−3δ) ·
∑
sn:(vn(i),un(i,m,j,k),sn)∈A∗(n)ǫ
Pr(Sn = sn)
≤ 2−n(RSM−δ) · 2−n(I(V;Y)+I(U;Z|V)−I(U;S)−3δ) · 2nH(S|U)+nǫ · 2−nH(S)+nǫ
= 2−n(RSM−δ) · 2−n(I(V;Y)+I(U;Z|V)−I(U;S)−3δ) · 2−nI(S;U)+2nǫ
= 2−n(RSM−δ) · 2−n(I(V;Y)+I(U;Z|V)−3δ)+2nǫ ,
which along with the lowerbound on Pr(Sn ∈ E) above implies that
Pr((Vn,Un) = (vn(i),un(i,m, j, k))|Sn ∈ E)
≤ 2−nRSM · 2−n(I(V;Y)+I(U;Z|V))+nǫ5
= 2−nI(U;Y)+nǫ5 .
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Also, we know that the size of the codebook in which (Vn,Un) take values is less than 2nI(U;Y) which
implies that
H(Un,Vn|Sn ∈ E) ≥ nI(U;Y)− nǫ5.
Using this we can bound the first term in (13).
H(Un|Vn) = H(Un,Vn)−H(Vn)
(a)
≥ H(Un,Vn)− n(I(V;Y))
(b)
≥ H(Un,Vn|Sn ∈ E) · Pr(Sn ∈ E)− n(I(V;Y))
= nI(U;Y)− nI(V;Y)− nǫ6
= nI(U;Y|V) − nǫ6,
where (a) follows from the fact that Vn takes values in a codebook whose size is smaller than 2nI(V;Y),
and (b) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy.
We bound the second term in (13) as follows
H(Zn|Un,Vn) = H(Zn|Un)
=
∑
un
Pr(Un = un)H(Zn|Un = un)
(a)
=
∑
un
Pr(Un = un)
∑
µ∈U
N(µ|un)H(Z|U = µ)
(b)
≥
∑
un
Pr(Un = un)
∑
µ∈U
n(Pr(U = µ)− ǫ)H(Z|U = µ)
=
∑
un
Pr(Un = un)(nH(Z|U) − nǫ7)
= nH(Z|U)− nǫ7,
where (a) follows from the memoryless nature of the virtual channel from U to Z and N(µ|un) counts the
number of times µ appears in the codeword un, and (b) follows from the fact that all the un codewords
belong to A∗(n)ǫ . Note that from (a) onwards, we use U,Z to denote a pair of random variables distributed
according to the joint distribution pU,Z.
The third term can be bounded by using Fano’s inequality and the fact that Eve can recover the Un
codeword with a probability of error ǫ when she has access to M and Vn in addition to her observation
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Z
n
.
H(Un|M,K,Zn,Vn) ≤ 1 + n · ǫ · I(U;Z|V) = nǫ8.
Finally, to bound the fourth term, let T be an indicator random variable which takes on the value 1
when (Vn,Zn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ and 0 otherwise.
H(Zn|Vn) ≤ H(Zn, T |Vn)
≤ 1 +H(Zn|Vn, T = 1)Pr(T = 1) + n log |Z|Pr(T = 0). (14)
But
Pr(T = 0) = Pr((Vn,Zn) /∈ A∗(n)ǫ ) ≤ ǫ9.
Furthermore, we have
H(Zn|Vn, T = 1) =
∑
vn
Pr(Vn = vn|T = 1)H(Zn|Vn = vn, T = 1)
(a)
≤
∑
vn
Pr(Vn = vn|T = 1) log |A∗(n)ǫ (pZ|V|v
n)|
≤
∑
vn
Pr(Vn = vn|T = 1)(nH(Z|V) + nǫ)
= nH(Z|V) + nǫ,
where in (a) we used |A∗(n)ǫ (pZ|V|vn)| to denote the size of the set of all zn such that (zn,vn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ .
Thus, (14) becomes
H(Zn|Vn) ≤ nH(Z|V) + nǫ10.
Hence, we may conclude from (13) that
1
n
H(M |Zn) ≥ I(U;Y|V) +H(Z|U) −H(Z|V) + ǫ11
= I(U;Y|V) − I(U;Z|V) + ǫ11
= RSM + ǫ11.
Thus we have shown the secrecy condition.
October 27, 2018 DRAFT
29
B. Case 2: I(U;S) > I(V;Y) + I(U;Z|V)
In this case, we only need to show the achievability of
RSM = I(U;Y) − I(U;S), and
RSK = I(U;S) − I(V;Y) − I(U;Z|V).
We proceed as in case 1. Note that below we assume RSM > 0. If RSM = 0, the only modification
needed is to avoid the binning step associated with the secret message.
Random Coding Argument
e) Codebook Generation: We generate a codebook of blocklength-n with 2n(I(U;Y)−2δ) elements
composed of two parts. The first part is a blocklength n V-codebook of size 2n(I(V;Y)−δ) codewords
by drawing the codewords uniformly from the ǫ-strongly typical set A∗(n)ǫ of n-length V sequences,
indexing each by i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(I(V;Y)−δ)}. For each codeword vn, a conditional U-codebook of
size 2n(I(U;Y|V)−δ) is created by drawing the codewords uniformly from the set of n-length U se-
quences which are conditionally ǫ-strongly typical conditioned on the V sequence vn. For each con-
ditional codebook, we distribute these sequences among 2n(RSM−3δ) bins such that each bin contains
2n(I(U;S)−I(V;Y)+2δ) codewords. We index the bins by m, where m ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(RSM−3δ)}. The sequences
in each bin are assigned to 2n(RSK+3δ) subbins so that each subbin contains 2n(I(U;Z|V)−δ) codewords,
indexing each subbin by k ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(RSK+3δ)}. We index each of the elements in the subbin by
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(I(U;Z|V)−δ)}, and denote the specific index as Φsub−index. For a U-codeword, we will
explicitly indicate its index as un(i,m, k, ℓ).
f) Encoding: Let m ∈ {1, . . . , 2n(RSM−3δ)} index the secret message. For this fixed m, Alice selects
a Vn(i),Un(i,m, k, ℓ) such that (Vn,Un(i,m, k, ℓ), Sn) are jointly typical. If none are found, Alice
declares an error. A test channel pX|U,S stochastically encodes the channel input Xn. The subbin index
k is set as the secret key. Note that the secret key is determined automatically by the Un(i,m, k, ℓ)
selected.
For a fixed m, and the probability of an encoding failure is given by
Pe ≤Pr(S
n /∈ A∗(n)ǫ ) +
∑
sn∈A∗(n)ǫ
pS(s
n)·



 ∑
vn∈A∗(n)ǫ
Pr(Vn = vn)
[
1− Pr((vn,Un, sn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ |V
n = vn)
]2n(I(U;S)−I(V;Y)+2δ)
2n(I(V;Y)−δ)

 .
where the term Pr(Vn = vn) is evaluated with the distribution for Vn being given by the uniform
distribution over all ǫ-strongly typical vn sequences, Pr((vn,Un, sn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ |Vn = vn) is evaluated
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with Un being uniformly distributed over the set A∗(n)ǫ (pU|V|Vn = vn) of all un sequences which are
conditionally ǫ-strongly typical with vn. As in case 1, since V and S are independent, for sn ∈ A∗(n)ǫ
and vn ∈ A∗(n)ǫ ,
Pr((vn,Un, sn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ |V
n = vn) ≥ 2−n(I(U;S|V)+ǫ1)
= 2−n(I(U;S)+ǫ1).
Using this in the term within the braces in the upperbound for Pe and simplifying
 ∑
vn∈A
∗(n)
ǫ
|A∗(n)ǫ (pV)|
−1 ·
[
1− Pr((vn,Un, sn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ |V
n = vn)
]2n(I(U;S)−I(V;Y)+2δ)
2n(I(V;Y)−δ)
≤

 ∑
vn∈A∗(n)ǫ
|A∗(n)ǫ (pV)|
−1 ·
[
1− 2−n(I(U;S)+ǫ1)
]2n(I(U;S)−I(V;Y)+2δ)
2n(I(V;Y)−δ)
=
[[
1− 2−n(I(U;S|V)+ǫ1)
]2n(I(U;S)−I(V;Y)+2δ)]2n(I(V;Y)−δ)
(a)
≤ e−2
−n(I(U;S)+ǫ1)·2n(I(U;S)+δ) ,
where (a) follows from the inequality 1 − x ≤ e−x. Substituting this in the upperbound for Pe, as in
case 1, we can make Pe as small as desired by choosing sufficiently small δ, ǫ (δ > ǫ1), and sufficiently
large n.
g) Decoding at Bob: Bob receives Yn and searches for a unique (Vn(ˆi),Un (ˆi, mˆ, kˆ, ℓˆ)) pair
such that (Vn(ˆi),Un(ˆi, mˆ, kˆ, ℓˆ),Yn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ . If no such pair exists, Bob declares an error. Otherwise
Bob declares mˆ to be the secret message and kˆ to be the secret key. Conditioned on encoding being
successful, an error results only if there is a pair (mˆ, kˆ) 6= (m,k) such that there are iˆ and ℓˆ and(
V
n(ˆi),Un(ˆi, mˆ, kˆ1, ℓˆ),Y
n
)
∈ A
∗(n)
ǫ . We can upperbound the probability of this by
∑
iˆ
∑
(mˆ,kˆ)6=(m,k)
∑
ℓˆ
Pr
(
(Vn(ˆi),Un (ˆi, mˆ, kˆ, ℓˆ),Yn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ
)
=
∑
iˆ 6=i
∑
(mˆ,kˆ)6=(m,k)
∑
ℓˆ
Pr
(
(Vn(ˆi),Un(ˆi, mˆ, kˆ, ℓˆ),Yn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ
)
+
∑
(mˆ,kˆ)6=(m,k)
∑
ℓˆ
Pr
(
(Vn(i),Un(i, mˆ, kˆ, ℓˆ),Yn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ
)
≤ 2n(I(U;Y)−2δ)2−n(I(U;Y)−ǫ2) + 2n(I(U;Y|V)−δ)2−n(I(U;Y|V)−ǫ3) ,
which can be made as small as desired by choosing sufficiently small δ, ǫ (δ > ǫ2, ǫ3), and sufficiently
large n.
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h) Decoding at Eve with side information: Consider Eve who has access to M,K,Vn. Then, the
subbin in which a potential Un exists is known to be at most 2n(I(U;Z|V)−δ). The probability of error
of the jointly typical decoder for Un in this bin given Zn can be bounded as above. There are two error
events: E1 is the event no sequence in the bin is jointly typical with Zn, and E2 is the event a false
sequence in the subbin is jointly typical with Zn. We have, P (E1) → 0 as n →∞ and the probability
that a false sequence is jointly typical with Zn is 2−n(I(U;Z|V)−ǫ4). By a union bound, we can make the
probability of error as small as desired by choosing sufficiently small δ, ǫ (δ > ǫ4), and sufficiently large
n.
By the usual random coding arguments, as in case 1, we may now conclude that for any δ > 0, for
sufficiently large n, there exists a codebook with the rates as set above, such that (i) Bob can recover
the secret message and the secret key with the probability of error not larger than δ and (ii) Eve, when
provided with the message and the V codeword, can recover the U codeword with probability of error
not larger than δ. We now have to verify that this implies that (1) Eve’s information about the message
(given Zn) goes to zero (secrecy condition) and (2) the secret key is approximately uniformly distributed
over its alphabet (uniformity condition).
Proof of Secrecy Condition.
First we observe that
H(M,K|Zn) ≥ H(M,K|Zn,Vn)
= H(M,K,Zn|Vn)−H(Zn|Vn)
= H(M,K,Un,Zn|Vn)−H(Un|M,K,Zn,Vn)−H(Zn|Vn)
(a)
≥ H(Un,Zn|Vn)−H(Un|M,K,Zn,Vn)−H(Zn|Vn)
= H(Un|Vn) +H(Zn|Un,Vn)−H(Un|M,K,Zn,Vn)−H(Zn|Vn) , (15)
where (a) follows from H(M,K|Un,Zn,Vn) ≥ 0. We now bound each of these terms. Let us define,
for every un(i,m, k, ℓ) codeword
E = {sn : ∃(i,m, k, ℓ) such that (vn(i),un(i,m, k, ℓ), sn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ } (16)
Recall that for all α > 0, there exists n sufficiently large such that decoding (and hence encoding)
succeeds with probability greater than 1− α, i.e.,
Pr(Sn ∈ E) ≥ 1− α .
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Furthermore, the probability
Pr ((Vn,Un) = (vn,un(i,m, k, ℓ)), Sn ∈ E)
= Pr (M = m,K = k, (Vn,Un) = (vn,un(i,m, k, ℓ)), Sn ∈ E)
= Pr (M = m) ·
∑
sn:(vn(i),un(i,m,j,k),sn)∈A∗(n)ǫ
Pr (Sn = sn)
≤ 2−n(I(U;Y)−I(U;S)−3δ) · 2nH(S|U)+nǫ2−nH(S)+nǫ
= 2−nI(U;Y)+3nδ+2nǫ ,
which, along with the lower bound on Pr(Sn ∈ E) above implies that
Pr ((Vn,Un) = (vn,un(i,m, k, ℓ))|Sn ∈ E)
≤ 2−nI(U;Y)+nǫ12 . (17)
Also, we know that the size of the codebook in which (Vn,Un) take values is less than 2nI(U;Y), which
implies that
H(Un,Vn|Sn ∈ E) ≥ nI(U;Y)− nǫ12 .
Using this, we can bound the first term in (15):
H(Un|Vn) = H(Un,Vn)−H(Vn)
(a)
≥ H(Un,Vn)− n(I(V;Y))
(b)
≥ H(Un,Vn|Sn ∈ E) · Pr(Sn ∈ E)− nI(V;Y)
= nI(U;Y)− nI(V;Y)− nǫ13 ,
where (a) follows from the fact that Vn takes values in a codebook whose size is smaller than 2nI(V;Y),
and (b) follows from the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy.
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We bound the second term in (15) as follows:
H(Zn|Un,Vn) = H(Zn|Un)
=
∑
un
Pr(Un = un)H(Zn|Un = un)
(a)
=
∑
un
Pr(Un = un)
∑
µ∈U
N(µ|un)H(Z|U = µ)
(b)
≥
∑
un
Pr(Un = un)
∑
µ∈U
n(Pr(U = µ)− ǫ)H(Z|U = µ)
=
∑
un
Pr(Un = un)(nH(Z|U) − nǫ14)
= nH(Z|U)− nǫ14,
where (a) follows from the memoryless nature of the virtual channel from U to Z and N(µ|un) counts the
number of times µ appears in the codeword un, and (b) follows from the fact that all the un codewords
belong to A∗(n)ǫ .
The third term can be bounded by using Fano’s inequality and the fact that Eve can recover the Un
codeword with a probability of error ǫ when she has access to M and Vn in addition to her observation
Z
n
.
H(Un|M,K,Zn,Vn) ≤ 1 + n · ǫ · I(U;Z|V) = nǫ15.
Finally, to bound the fourth term, let T be an indicator random variable which takes on the value 1
when (Vn,Zn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ and 0 otherwise.
H(Zn|Vn) ≤ H(Zn, T |Vn)
≤ 1 +H(Zn|Vn, T = 1)Pr(T = 1) + n log |Z|Pr(T = 0). (18)
But
Pr(T = 0) = Pr((Vn,Zn) /∈ A∗(n)ǫ ) ≤ ǫ16.
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Furthermore, we have
H(Zn|Vn, T = 1) =
∑
vn
Pr(Vn = vn|T = 1)H(Zn|Vn = vn, T = 1)
(a)
≤
∑
vn
Pr(Vn = vn|T = 1) log |A∗(n)ǫ (pZ|V|v
n)|
≤
∑
vn
Pr(Vn = vn|T = 1)(nH(Z|V) + nǫ)
= nH(Z|V) + nǫ,
where in (a) we used |A∗(n)ǫ (pZ|V|vn)| to denote the size of the set of all zn such that (zn,vn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ .
Thus, (18) becomes
H(Zn|Vn) ≤ nH(Z|V) + nǫ17.
Hence, we may conclude from (15) that
1
n
H(M,K|Zn) ≥ I(U;Y|V) +H(Z|U)−H(Z|V) + ǫ18
= I(U;Y|V) − I(U;Z|V) + ǫ18
= RSM +RSK + ǫ18.
Thus we have shown the secrecy condition.
Proof of Uniformity Condition.
Note that from (17), we have that
H(K) = H(Vn,M,K,Φsub−index)−H(V
n,M,Φsub−index|K)
(a)
≥ H(Vn,M,K,Φsub−index)− (I(V;Y) + nRSM + I(U;Z|V))
(b)
≥ H(Vn,M,K,Φsub−index|S
n ∈ E) · Pr(Sn ∈ E)
− (I(V;Y) + nRSM + I(U;Z|V))
(c)
≥ nI(U;Y) − (I(V;Y) + nRSM + I(U;Z|V)) − nǫ13
= RSK − nǫ13 .
where (a) follows since Vn is drawn from a codebook with no more than 2nI(V;Y) elements, M has
less than 2nRSM elements, and Φsub−index has no more than 2nI(U;Z|V) elements; (b) since conditional
entropy is less than or equal to entropy; and (c) from the lower bound in (17). Since ǫ13 → 0 as ǫ→ 0,
we satisfy the uniformity condition.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The achievability follows directly from Theorem 2 by setting the auxiliary random variables as follows.
V1 = (XF ,XR),
V2 = (V2,F ,XR),
U1 = U1,F .
It is easy to see that this satisfies the Markov conditions on the auxiliary random variables. Substituting
these in the expression in Theorem 2 shows the achievability. The interpretation is that, we have ignored
the reversely degraded source component, and the reversely degraded channel is used purely as a channel
for public communication.
To show the converse, let J and J ′ be independent random variables both uniformly distributed over
{1, 2, . . . , n} and independent of all other random variables. To get the first condition (ignoring o(n)
terms)
n(I(XF,J ;YF,J) + I(XR,J ;YR,J )) ≥ nI(XJ ;YJ )
≥ nI(XJ ;YJ |J)
≥ I(Xn;Yn)
(a)
= I(Xn;Yn, ZnF )
= I(M,K,SnA,X
n;Yn, ZnF )
≥ I(M,K,SnA;Y
n, ZnF )
≥ I(M,K,SnA;Y
n, ZnF )− I(S
n
B ,S
n
E ;Y
n, ZnF )
(b)
= I(M,K,SnA;Y
n, ZnF |S
n
B ,S
n
E)
= I(M ;Yn, ZnF |S
n
B ,S
n
E) + I(K,S
n
A;Y
n, ZnF |S
n
B ,S
n
E ,M)
(c)
= H(M |SnB ,S
n
E) + I(K,S
n
A;Y
n, ZnF |S
n
B ,S
n
E ,M)
= H(M) + I(K,SnA;Y
n, ZnF |S
n
B ,S
n
E ,M)
= nRSM + I(K,S
n
A;Y
n, ZnF |S
n
B ,S
n
E ,M)
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where (a) is due to the sub-channel F to Eve being degraded w.r.t. the channel to Bob, (b) is because
(SnB ,S
n
E)−S
n
A− (M,K,Y
n, ZnF ) is a Markov chain, and (c) follows from Fano’s inequality which gives
H(M |Yn,SnB) = o(n). Now, to bound the second term, we write
I(K,SnA;Y
n, ZnF |S
n
B ,S
n
E ,M)
= H(Yn, ZnF |S
n
B ,S
n
E ,M)−H(Y
n, ZnF |K,M,S
n
A,S
n
B ,S
n
E)
≥ H(Yn, ZnF |S
n
B ,S
n
E ,M)−H(K,Y
n, ZnF |S
n
A,S
n
B ,S
n
E ,M)
(a)
= H(K,Yn, ZnF |S
n
B ,S
n
E ,M)−H(K,Y
n, ZnF |S
n
A,S
n
B ,S
n
E ,M)
= I(K,Yn, ZnF ;S
n
A|S
n
B ,S
n
E ,M)
(b)
= I(M,K,Yn, ZnF ;S
n
A|S
n
B ,S
n
E)
≥ I(M,K,Yn, ZnF ;S
n
A,F |S
n
A,R,S
n
B ,S
n
E)
= I(M,K,Yn, ZnF ;S
n
A,F |S
n
A,R, S
n
B,F , S
n
E,F )
=
n∑
i=1
I(M,K,Yn, ZnF ;SA,F,i|S
i−1
A,F , S
n
A,R, S
n
B,F , S
n
E,F )
≥
n∑
i=1
I(M,K,Yn, ZnF ;SA,F,i|S
n
A,R, S
n
B,F , S
n
E,F )
=
n∑
i=1
I(M,K,Yn, ZnF , SB,F,˜i, SE,F,˜i, S
n
A,R;SA,F,i|SB,F,i, SE,F,i)
= nI(M,K,Yn, ZnF , SB,F,J˜ ′, SE,F,J˜ ′, S
n
A,R;SA,F,J ′|SB,F,J ′, SE,F,J ′, J
′)
(c)
= nI(M,K,Yn, ZnF , SB,F,J˜ ′ , SE,F,J˜ ′, S
n
A,R, J
′;SA,F,J ′|SB,F,J ′ , SE,F,J ′)
= nI(U1,F ;SA,F,J ′|SB,F,J ′ , SE,F,J ′)
(d)
= nI(U1,F ;SA,F,J ′|SB,F,J ′)
(e)
= n(I(U1,F ;SA,F,J ′)− I(U1,F ;SB,F,J ′)),
where we define SB,F,˜i
def
= (Si−1B,F , S
n
B,F,i+1), SE,F,˜i
def
= (Si−1E,F , S
n
E,F,i+1), and
U1,F
def
= (M,K,Yn, ZnF , SB,F,J˜ ′, SE,F,J˜ ′, S
n
A,R, J
′). Note that (a) follows from Fano’s inequality which
implies that H(K|Yn,SnB) = o(n), (b) follows the independence of M from (SnA,SnB ,SnC). To see (c),
note that (SA,J ′ ,SB,J ′ ,SE,J ′) has the same joint distribution as (SA,SB ,SE). This equivalence of joint
distributions together with the fact that U1,F does indeed satisfy the Markov condition U1,F − SA,J ′ −
(SB,J ′ ,SE,J ′) implies that U1,F −SA,F,J ′ −SB,F,J ′ −SE,F,J ′ is a Markov chain, which gives us (d) and
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(e). To get condition 2,
n(RSK +RSM) ≤ I(M,K;Y
n, ZnF ,S
n
B ,S
n
E)
(a)
= I(M,K;Yn, ZnF ,S
n
B ,S
n
E)− I(M,K;Z
n,SnE)
(b)
= I(M,K;Yn, ZnF ,S
n
B ,S
n
E)− I(M,K;Z
n, Y nR ,S
n
E)
≤ I(M,K;Yn, ZnF ,S
n
B ,S
n
E)− I(M,K;Z
n
F , Y
n
R ,S
n
E)
(c)
= I(M,K;Y nF , S
n
B,F |Y
n
R , Z
n
F ,S
n
E)
= I(M,K;Y nF |Y
n
R , Z
n
F ,S
n
E) + I(M,K;S
n
B,F |Y
n, ZnF ,S
n
E)
≤ I(M,K,SnE , Y
n
R ,X
n
F ;Y
n
F |Z
n
F ) + I(M,K;S
n
B,F |Y
n, ZnF ,S
n
E)
= I(XnF ;Y
n
F |Z
n
F ) +
n∑
i=1
I(M,K;SB,F,i|Y
n, ZnF , S
i−1
B,F ,S
n
E)
= H(Y nF |Z
n
F )−
n∑
i=1
H(YF,i|XF,i, ZF,i) +
n∑
i=1
I(M,K;SB,F,i|Y
n, ZnF , S
i−1
B,F ,S
n
E)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(YF,i|ZF,i)−
n∑
i=1
H(YF,i|XF,i, ZF,i) +
n∑
i=1
I(M,K,Yn, ZnF , SB,F,˜i, SE,F,˜i, S
n
A,R;SB,F,i|SE,i)
= nI(XF,J ;YF,J |ZF,J , J) + nI(M,K,Y
n, ZnF , SB,F,J˜ ′, SE,F,J˜ ′, S
n
A,R;SB,F,J ′|SE,F,J ′, J
′)
≤ nI(XF,J ;YF,J |ZF,J , J) + nI(U1,F ;SB,F,J ′ |SE,F,J ′)
(d)
= n(I(XF,J ;YF,J |V2,F )− I(XF,J ;ZF,J |V2,F )) + n(I(U1,F ;SB,F,J ′)− I(U1,F ;SE,F,J ′))
where V2,F
def
= J , (a) follows from the hypothesis I(M,K;Zn,SnE) = o(n), (b) from the fact that
I(M,K;Y nR |S
n
E ,Z
n) = 0, which we show below, (c) from the Markov chain (M,K,Yn, ZnF ,SnA) −
SnE,R − S
n
B,R, and (d) from the degradation of the source component F and the sub-channel F .
0 = I(SnA,M,K;Y
n
R |Z
n)
(a)
= I(SnE ,S
n
A,M,K;Y
n
R |Z
n) ≥ I(M,K;Y nR |S
n
E ,Z
n) ,
where (a) follows from the Markov chain SnE − (SnA,M,K) − Zn − Y nR . By non-negativity of mutual
information, I(M,K;Y nR |SnE ,Zn) = 0 as claimed above.
Thus, we have shown that if (R1, R2) ∈ C, then there must exist random variables U1,F and V2,F
jointly distributed with XF , YF , ZF , XR, YR, ZR, SA,F , SB,F , SE,F , SA,R, SB,R, SE,R such that their
joint distribution is of the following form
pSA,F ,SB,F ,SE,F pSA,R,SB,R,SE,RpU1,F |SA,F ,SA,RpV2,F ,XF pYF ,ZF |XF pXRpYR,ZR|XR ,
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and
RSM ≤ I(XF , YF ) + I(XR;YR)− (I(U1,F ;SA,F )− I(U1,F ;SB,F )), (19)
RSK +RSM ≤ I(XF ;YF |V2,F )− I(XF ;ZF |V2,F ) + I(U1,F ;SB,F )− I(U1,F ;SE,F ). (20)
The form of the right hand sides above further allows us to assert that the U1,F above may be independent
of SA,R, i.e., it is enough to consider joint distributions of the form
pSA,F ,SB,F ,SE,F pSA,R,SB,R,SE,RpU1,F |SA,F pV2,F ,XF pYF ,ZF |XF pXRpYR,ZR|XR . (21)
This completes the proof.
i) Bandwidth mismatch: Suppose there is a bandwidth mismatch of mS source symbols for every
mC channel symbols. Then, for a blocklength n of channel symbols, we have nS
def
= ⌊nmS/mC⌋ source
symbols. The only modification we need to make to the converse is to set J ′ to be uniformly distributed
over {1, 2, . . . , nS}. It is straightforward to verify that the arguments carry over to the bandwidth mismatch
setting.
j) Stochastically degraded case: Theorem 3 also holds when the channels and sources are only
stochastically degraded. Achievability follows directly from Theorem 2. For the converse, let us recall
the definition of stochastic degradation. For the source component F made up of SA,F , SB,F , SE,F ,
stochastic degradation means that there is a conditional distribution pS˜E,F |SA,F ,SB,F such that we may
define a random variable S˜E,F jointly distributed with SA,F , SB,F which satisfies (i) SA,F − SB,F −
S˜E,F is a Markov chain, and (ii) (SA,F , S˜E,F ) has the same joint distribution as (SA,F , SE,F ). With-
out loss of generality, we may assume that the joint distribution of SA,F , SB,F , SE,F , S˜E,F follows
pSA,F ,SB,F pSE,F |SA,F ,SB,F pS˜E,F |SA,F ,SB,F . Similarly, for the subchannel F given by pYF ,ZF |XF , there is
a conditional distribution pYF ,Z˜F |XF such that XF − YF − Z˜F is a Markov chain and pZ˜F |XF is the
same as pZF |XF . Again, without loss of generality, the conditional distribution of YF , ZF , Z˜F conditional
on X may be assumed to follow pYF |XF pZF |XF ,YF pZ˜F |XF ,YF . Similarly, we have S˜B,R and Y˜R. Let
S˜E = (S˜E,F , SE,R), S˜B = (SB,F , S˜B,R), Y˜ = (YF , Y˜R), and Z˜ = (Z˜F , ZR).
Notice, first of all, that for any coding scheme I(M,K;SnE ,Zn) only depends on the joint distribution
of random variables available at Alice and Eve. By the definition of stochastic degradation, this implies
that
I(M,K; S˜nE , Z˜
n) = I(M,K;SnE ,Z
n).
Hence, secrecy condition also applies for a dummy Eve who receives (S˜nE , Z˜n) instead of the actual
observations of Eve, i.e., I(M,K; S˜n, Z˜n) = o(n). Similarly, the probability of decoding error for Bob
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is only a function of the joint distribution of random variables at Alice and Bob which is again preserved
if we consider a dummy Bob who receives (S˜nB , Z˜n). Hence, we may now repeat our converse arguments
for the setup with dummy Bob and dummy Eve who have physically degraded sources and channels. We
can verify that if (R1, R2) ∈ C, our converse proof in fact implies the existence of U1,F and V2,F which
satisfy
RSM ≤ I(XF , YF ) + I(XR; Y˜R)− (I(U1,F ;SA,F )− I(U1,F ;SB,F )), (22)
RSK +RSM ≤ I(XF ;YF |V2,F )− I(XF ; Z˜F |V2,F ) + I(U1,F ;SB,F )− I(U1,F ; S˜E,F ). (23)
with joint distributions of the form
pSA,F ,SB,F pSE,F |SA,F ,SB,F pS˜E,F |SA,F ,SB,F pSA,R,SB,R,S˜B,R,SE,RpU1,F |SA,F pV2,F ,XF pYF ,ZF ,Z˜F |XF pXRpYR,Y˜R,ZR|XR .
(24)
Using the fact that pY˜R|X = pYR|X we can replace Y˜R in (22). Similarly, using the fact that pZ˜F |XF =
pZF |XF (which by (24) implies that pV2,F ,XF ,Z˜F = pV2,F ,XF ,ZF ) we may replace Z˜F in (23) by ZF . By a
similar argument, we may also replace S˜E,F in (23) by SE,F . Finally, by marginalizing away the dummy
variables in (24) we have the result for stochastically degraded case as well.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
While we stated the Theorems 2 and 3 only for finite alphabets, the results can be extended to continuous
alphabets. We note that the scalar Gaussian problem satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3 (along with
Remark 1 following it).
Observe that in the notation of Theorem 2, SA,F = SA and SB,F = SB . Further, SA,R, SB,R, SE,F ,
and SE,R are absent (assumed to be constants). When, SNREve ≥ SNRBob, we have XR = X,YR = Y ,
and ZR = Z , and the forwardly degraded sub-channel is absent (again, we may take the random variables
of this sub-channel to be constants). When SNRBob ≥ SNREve, we have XF = X,YF = Y , and ZF = Z
and the reversely degraded sub-channel is absent. Hence, from Theorem 2, C is given by the union of
R˜(p) over all joint distributions p. Also, R˜(p) is described by
RSM ≤ I(XF ;YF ) + I(XR;YR)− I(U1;SA|SB), (25)
RSK +RSM ≤ I(XF ;YF |V2)− I(XF ;ZF |V2) + I(U1;SB). (26)
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When specialized to the Gaussian case above, it is easy to see that
I(XF ;YF ) + I(XR;YR) ≤ CY , and
I(XF ;YF |V2)− I(XF ;ZF |V2) ≤ [CY −CZ ]+,
where CY = 12 log(1+SNRBob) and CZ =
1
2 log(1+SNREve). These bounds are simultaneously achieved
when p is such that V2 is a constant and X is Gaussian of variance SNRBob. Hence, we may rewrite, the
conditions above as
RSM ≤ CY − I(U1;SA) + I(U1;SB), (27)
RSK +RSM ≤ [CY − CZ ]+ + I(U1;SB). (28)
Now we show outerbounds to the above R˜(p) which match the two conditions in proposition 4. It will
also become clear that a jointly Gaussian choice for p in fact achieves these outerbound thus completing
the proof. We first derive an upperbound on RSM which matches the first condition in proposition 4.
From the two inequalities (27) and (28) above, we have
RSM ≤ CY − I(U1;SA) + I(U1;SB), (29)
RSM ≤ [CY − CZ ]+ + I(U1;SB). (30)
Using entropy power inequality,
exp(2h(SB |U)) ≥ exp(2h(SA|U)) + exp(2h(Nsource))
Using this in (29), we may write
exp(2RSM) ≤ exp(2(CY + I(U1;SB)− h(SA))) (exp(2(h(SB)− I(U1;SB)))− exp(2h(Nsource)))
= exp(2(CY − h(SA) + h(SB)))− exp(2(CY − h(SA) + h(Nsource))) exp(2I(U1;SB))
(a)
≤ exp(2(CY − h(SA) + h(SB)))− exp(2RSM) exp(2(CY − [CY − CZ ]+ − h(SA) + h(Nsource))),
where (a) results from (30). Rearranging, we have
RSM ≤
exp(2(CY − h(SA) + h(SB)))
1 + exp(2(CY − [CY − CZ ]+ − h(SA) + h(Nsource)))
=
(1 + SNRBob)(1 + SNRsrc)
1 + SNRsrc +min(SNRBob,SNREve)
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which is the first condition in proposition 4. Now let us fix RSM such that it satisfies this condition. Let
us rewrite (27) as follows
h(SA|U) ≥ (RSM − CY + h(SA)− h(SB)) + h(SB |U).
Entropy power inequality implies that
exp(2h(SB |U)) ≥ exp(2h(SA|U)) + exp(2h(Nsource))
≥ exp(2(RSM − CY + h(SA)− h(SB))) exp(2h(SB |U)) + 1.
Since
RSM ≤
(1 + SNRBob)(1 + SNRsrc)
1 + SNRsrc +min(SNRBob,SNREve)
≤
1
2
log
(1 + SNRBob)(1 + SNRsrc)
SNRsrc
= CY−h(SA)+h(SB),
we have
exp(2h(SB |U)) ≥
1
1− exp(2(RSM − CY + h(SA)− h(SB)))
.
From (28),
exp(2RSK) ≤ exp(2([CY − CZ ]+ + h(SB)− h(SB |U)−RSM))
≤ exp(2([CY − CZ ]+ + h(SB)−RSM))(1 − exp(2(RSM − CY + h(SA)− h(SB))))
≤ exp(2([CY − CZ ]+ − CY ))(exp(2(CY + h(SB)−RSM))− exp(2h(SA)))
which evaluates to the second condition required. The inequalities used above are tight under a Gaussian
choice for the auxiliary random variable which proves the achievability.
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